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Abstract
Why did the Japanese economy stagnate before World War II, how
did it achieve rapid economic growth after the war, and why did it stag-
nate again after the 1970s? To answer these questions, I developed a
two-country trade model with technology transfer, where rms in the two
countries compete in a Bertrand fashion, where rms in a developed coun-
try (the U.S.) transfer technology to rms in a developing country (Japan)
if it is protable to do so, and where the technology transfer is the engine
of economic growth. In this model, among multiple equilibria, the equi-
librium with low labor cost in Japan was chosen during the rapid growth
period. As a result, the rms in the developed country transferred tech-
nology to the rms in the developing country, resulting in rapid growth.
However, during the other periods, the equilibrium with high labor cost in
Japan was chosen, which caused stagnation. The model is quantitatively
consistent with the per capita GDP relative to the U.S., the purchasing
power parity-exchange rate ratio, and to some degree, the swings in labor
share of postwar Japan.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
The Japanese economy experienced rapid economic growth between the end of
the World War II and the early 1970s. During this period, real per capita GDP
grew at a rate of over 10% (see Figure 1). The following questions arise from
this fact: Why did the Japanese economy stagnate before World War II, how
did it achieve rapid economic growth after the war, and why did it stagnate
again after the 1970s?
One possible and leading explanation is technology adoption (Peck and
Tamura, 1976; Goto, 1993): rapid growth occurred because the Japanese rms
imported and adopted superior foreign technologies in the postwar period, led
to the increase in productivity and output.
However, this explanation raises further questions: For example, if technol-
ogy adoption was the reason for rapid growth after the war, why did not Japan
adopt more technologies and achieve rapid growth before the war? If prewar
Japan had achieved rapid growth by technology adoption, the rewards would
have been tremendous. Therefore, to analyze the more fundamental reasons for
the rapid growth, we have to consider why economic agents did not adopt better
technologies; that is, we have to consider the incentives of agents.
Parente and Prescott (2000) propose such a model. In their model, prewar
Japan could not adopt technologies because vested interests prevented such
adoption. Postwar Japan could adopt technologies because then these vested
interests disappeared. However, again after the 1970s, Japan could not adopt
technologies well because the vested interests partially reemerged.
Parente and Prescott (2000) assume that without the vested interests, Japanese
rms could freely adopt better foreign technologies. In their model, constraints
are on the agents' incentives in Japan. However, better technologies are not
available if the rms in developed countries (which I refer to as U.S. rms) keep
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their technologies (or know-how) secret or restrict the use of their technologies.
Therefore, constraints can also be on the agents' incentives in the U.S.
On the basis of this observation, this paper develops a two-country (the U.S.
and Japan) trade model in which constraints are on the incentives of agents in
the U.S.: i.e., technology transfer occurs only if a U.S. rm allows the transfer
(license) of its technology to a Japanese rm.
In the model, rms in the two countries compete in a Bertrand fashion. A
licenser U.S. rm benets from licensing technology by obtaining a licensing
fee. However, when the licenser U.S. rm licenses and transfers technology, the
licensee (a Japanese rm) becomes a competitor and decreases the U.S. rm's
prot. In the model, only if the benet (licensing fee) outweighs the cost (prot
loss), does the U.S. rm licenses the technology.
In this model, two kinds of equilibria exist. In one equilibrium, the labor
cost of Japan relative to that of the U.S. is low. Because the prot of Japanese
rms and, as a result, the licensing fee are high, licensing occurs (so does tech-
nology transfer). In another equilibrium, the relative labor cost of Japan is
high. Because the prot of Japanese rms and licensing fee are low, licensing
does not occur (neither does technology transfer).
The intuition of multiple equilibria is as follows. Suppose that Japan's wage
and labor cost are low and the U.S. wage and labor cost are high. Then, for the
Japanese rms, the prices they face are high because the competitor's labor cost,
i.e., the labor cost in the U.S., is high. Because of the high price, the Japanese
rms can sell a small volume of goods at a high prot, and hence, not many
workers are needed for producing the goods. As a result, Japan can produce a
broad range of goods and thus, comparatively less advantageous goods. Because
the relative wage rate of the countries is determined by the relative productivity
of the comparatively least advantageous goods in each country, Japan's wage
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rate becomes low. Thus, the equilibrium in which Japan's wage and labor cost
are low exists. Conversely, there exists another equilibrium in which Japan's
wage and labor cost are high.
Using this model, I interpret Japan's rapid growth in the following way. In
the prewar period, the economy was in an equilibrium where Japan's relative
labor cost was high. After the war, the economy unexpectedly shifted to another
equilibrium where Japan's relative labor cost was low, possibly owing to the
undervaluation of the yen under the Breton-Woods system. After the 1970s,
the rapid growth stopped because the economy unexpectedly shifted back to the
equilibrium where Japan's relative labor cost was high, possibly owing to the
end of the Breton-Woods system.
Further, I investigate the quantitative performance of this model. I nd
that the model is quantitatively consistent with the per capita GDP of Japan
relative to the U.S., the purchasing power parity-exchange rate ratio between
Japan and the U.S., and postwar Japan's labor share.
Several papers argue that the undervaluation of the currency, low labor cost,
and technology transfer are associated with economic development. First, Ro-
drik (2008) empirically shows that the undervaluation of the currency stimulates
economic growth. Rajan (2010) argues that Japan achieved export-led growth
by the undervalued currency. Second, Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) argue that
low labor cost is one of the reasons for Japan's rapid growth. Yoshikawa (1994)
points out that Japan's labor share increased considerably after the rapid growth
period. Finally, as mentioned above, Peck and Tamura (1976) and Goto (1993)
argue that technology adoption was the reason for Japan's rapid growth. This
paper shows that undervaluation of the currency, low labor cost, and technology
transfer are closely connected phenomena that contributed to the rapid growth
in Japan.
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In this paper, technology transfer is performed through licensing. Yang and
Maskus (2001), Tanaka et al. (2007), and Ghosh and Saha (2008), among others,
have developed models of economic growth with licensing. This paper's model
is based on the framework laid in these papers.
Recently, the Japanese economy was quantitatively analyzed using neoclas-
sical growth models. The literature shows the rapid increase in total factor
productivity (TFP) can account for salient features of the rapid growth (Par-
ente and Prescott, 1994; Chen et al., 2006; Otsu, 2009; Esteban-Pretel and
Yasuyuki, 2009; among others). If TFP was the reason for the rapid growth,
then Why did Japan's TFP stagnate before World War II, how did it rapidly in-
crease after the war, and why did it stagnate again after the 1970s? Hayashi and
Prescott (2008) develop a quantitative neoclassical growth model to explain the
prewar stagnation and the postwar growth. However, as noted in their paper,
their model does not explain why Japan's manufacturing TFP rapidly increased
after World War II. This paper presents a hypothesis for these questions by de-
veloping a quantitative model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some facts
supporting the hypothesis that during the rapid growth period, the yen was un-
dervalued because of low labor cost in Japan. Motivated by these facts, Section
3 introduces the basic version of the model and explains the basic intuition of
the model. Section 4 extends the basic model so that it is comparable with the
data. Using the extended model, Section 5 conducts a quantitative exercise and
compares the simulated results of the model with the data. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The Undervaluation of the Yen
Rodrik (2008; 2010) argues that the undervaluation of a currency is important
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for growth, even if the Balassa-Samuelson (hereafter BS) eect is taken into
account. Here, on the basis of facts, I argue that this claim also applies to
Japan's rapid growth and that the yen was undervalued because of low labor
cost in Japan.
2.1 The purchasing power parity-exchange rate ratio
Figure 2 plots the ratio of the purchasing power parity (PPP) and exchange
rate (hereafter PPP=e) between Japan and the U.S. It shows that during the
rapid growth period, the exchange rate of the yen was undervalued as compared
with PPP. Specically, during the rapid growth till the 1960s, the exchange
rate was 1$ = 360U whereas PPP was around 1$ = 150U. However, because
non-tradable goods in developing countries are cheaper, the currency of a devel-
oping country is undervalued. This is known as the BS hypothesis or BS eect.
According to the BS hypothesis, the undervaluation is a natural phenomenon.
In what follows, I argue that even if we subtract the BS eect, the yen was
undervalued. Before doing this, I review the BS hypothesis.
2.2 The BS hypothesis
The BS hypothesis assumes that there are competitive tradable and non-tradable
goods sectors in each of two countries, the U.S. and Japan. The productivity
level of non-tradable goods (e.g., hair cutting and taxi services) is the same
across countries whereas that of tradable goods is higher in the U.S. than in
Japan. In addition, I assume that the production technology is the constant-
returns-to-scale and that labor is the only production input. Labor is mobile
across sectors in the same country but is immobile across countries.
Under the assumptions, because one worker in the U.S. can produce more
tradables than one worker in Japan the wage rate in the U.S. should be higher
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than that in Japan so that the unit cost and thus, price of tradables equate
across the countries. Then, because one worker in each country produces the
same amount of non-tradables and the labor cost in the U.S. is higher, the price
of the non-tradables in the U.S. should be higher.
Suppose that PPP is constructed as the ratio of the geometric average of
tradables and non-tradables in each country and the exchange rate as the ratio
of tradables. Let pCT , p
C
N , w
C , and ACT be the prices of tradables and non-
tradables, the wage rate, and the productivity level of tradables in country C,
respectively. Then, under these assumptions, the PPP=e between Japan and
the U.S. becomes as follows:1
PPP=e =

pJT
pUT
 
pJN
pUN
1 
=

pJT
pUT

=

wJ
wU
1 
=

AJT
AUT
1 
< 1; (1)
where the superscripts U and J refer to the U.S. and Japan and  is the share
of tradables. I here assume that  is the same for both countries. The equa-
tion shows that PPP=e becomes less than 1. According to the hypothesis, the
undervaluation of the yen is a natural phenomenon.
2.3 The undervaluation of the yen
Using the framework, I argue that even after taking the BS eect into account,
the yen was undervalued. To show this, I rewrite the above equation in the
growth form as follows:
\PPP=e = (1  )(A^JT   A^UT );
where I express the growth rate byb. According to the equation, the growth
rate of PPP=e is higher when the growth rate of Japanese productivity is high
1The equation is obtained because pUT = p
J
T and p
C
N = w
C=AN , where AN is the produc-
tivity level of non-tradables and is the same across the countries.
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and thus, under standard settings, the growth rate of the Japanese per capita
income is higher. Did this relation hold in the postwar Japanese data?
Figure 3 plots the natural logarithm of PPP=e. The slope is the growth rate
of PPP=e,\PPP=e. The slope becomes steeper just after the rapid growth, where
the productivity convergence ends (see the solid black lines in the gure). The
increase in PPP=e just after the rapid growth cannot be explained by the BS
hypothesis at least in the simple form. This means that compared with today's
PPP=e, the yen was undervalued during the rapid growth period, even after
taking into account the BS eect.
2.4 One possible explanation: low labor cost
What was the reason for the increase in PPP=e just after the rapid growth?
Here, I argue that the answer is low labor cost in Japan during the rapid growth
period. By rewriting (1), the following relation also holds:
\PPP=e = (1  )(w^J   w^U ):
One interpretation of Figure 3 is that just after the rapid growth, wJ rapidly
increased but AJT (and per capita income y
J under standard settings) did not.
If so, the labor income share wJ=yJ = wJLJ=Y J would increase.
Figure 4 plots the labor shares of postwar Japan. The labor income shares
increased just after the rapid growth period ended, which supports the inter-
pretation that PPP=e was low during the rapid growth period because of the
low labor cost in Japan.
I argue that the rapid growth was associated with low labor cost. If so, the
prewar labor share should also be higher. To check this claim, Table 1 lists
the prewar (1932) and postwar (1957) labor share of manufacturing. The table
shows that the former is actually higher than the latter.
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In summary, the facts suggest that the rapid growth was associated with
low labor cost. In what follows, I develop a model that is consistent with this
nding.
3 The Basic Model
In this section, on the basis of the nding in the previous section, I develop
a simple model in which technology transfer and rapid growth are associated
with low labor cost. In the next section, I extend the basic model and conduct
quantitative analysis.
3.1 Environment
Here, I develop a Bertrand competition version of the Dornbusch et al. (1977)
model. The model has two countries (the U.S. U and Japan J) that trade
goods. There is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, which consists
of a continuum of tradable goods between [0; 1]:
X = XU +XJ = exp
Z 1
0
lnxidi

:
The households in each country receive a utility by consuming the aggregate
tradable goods XC (C 2 fU; Jg)). I normalize the price of X to be 1.
There is a Japanese and U.S. rm in each disaggregated goods sector pro-
ducing xi. They compete in a Bertrand fashion. There is only one production
factor in the economy: labor. Labor is mobile across sectors in the same country
but is immobile across the two countries. I assume that in the basic model of
this section, labor supply LCx is exogenous.
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3.2 Production technology
The rm's production function is as follows:
xCi = A
C
i `
C
i ; C 2 fU; Jg;
where ACi and `
C
i are the productivity and labor input of the rm in country
C. All the U.S. rms have AU technology, i.e., AUi = A
U (here, I slightly abuse
notations). The Japanese rms in [0; ] have AJ(< AU ), whereas the remaining
rms (rms in (; 1]) have AU . I do not consider technology transfer for a while
and let the technology cuto  be given.
3.3 Construction of equilibria
In this model, rms in comparatively advantageous sectors produce goods.
Thus, U.S. rms tend to produce in a sector in which AUi =A
J
i = A
U=AJ , and
Japanese rms tend to produce in a sector in which AUi =A
J
i = 1 (see Figure 5).
There are multiple equilibria in this model. Let  be the production cuto,
which is endogenous in the model, where the goods in [0; ] are produced by the
U.S. rms and the goods in (; 1] are produced by the Japanese rms. Then,
in an equilibrium (referred to as Equilibrium 1), where  is less than , some
goods (goods in (; ]) for which the Japanese rms have inferior technology
AJ are produced by the Japanese rms. In another equilibrium (referred to
as Equilibrium 2), where  is more than , some goods (goods in (; ]) for
which the Japanese rms have advanced technology AU are produced by the
U.S. rms. In what follows, I show that these two equilibria exist.
10
3.3.1 Equilibrium 1 ( < )
Here, I construct Equilibrium 1 where  < . In Equilibrium 1, goods in [0; ]
are produced by the U.S. rms, goods in (; ] are produced by the Japanese
rms with AJ technology, and goods in (; 1] are produced by the Japanese
rms with AU technology.
Due to the Bertrand competition, the U.S. rms set their price at pUi =
wJ=AJ . Their unit cost is ucUi = w
U=AU . On the other hand, the Japanese
rms in (; ] set their price at pJ1 = w
U=AU . (I denote the Japanese rm in
(; ] by J1 and the Japanese rm in (; 1] by
J
2 .) Their unit cost is uc
J
1 = w
J=AJ .
Because pCi  ucCi holds,
wU
wJ
=
AU
AJ
:
Using the above relation, I obtain  in the equilibrium. Since the production
function of the aggregated goods X is Cobb-Douglas, the following relation
holds:
pUi x
U
i =
wJ
AJ
AU`Ui = X:
By arranging this,
`Ui =
1
wJ
AJ
AU
X:
Using the property and the labor market clearing condition,
LUx =
Z 
0
`Ui di = 
1
wJ
AJ
AU
X: (2)
Next, I obtain a property similar to (2) for Japan. Rearranging the Cobb-
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Douglas property,
pJ1x
J
1 =
wU
AU
AJ`J1 = X; p
J
2x
J
2 =
wU
AU
AU`J2 = X;
I obtain the following relations:
`J1 =
1
wU
AU
AJ
X; `J2 =
1
wU
X:
Using these properties and the labor market clearing condition,
LJx =
Z 1

`Ji di = (  )
1
wU
AU
AJ
X + (1  ) 1
wU
X: (3)
Using (2) and (3), I nally obtain  in Equilibrium 1:
 =
LUx
LJx
1 + A
U
AJ
LUx
LJx

AU
AJ
  1

+ 1

: (4)
Using (4), I verify under what condition the assumption of Equilibrium 1,
i.e.,  < , is true. Figure 6 plots (4). Figure 6 shows that if
  1
1 +
LJx
LUx
; (5)
 is less than ; i.e., Equilibrium 1 exists.
3.3.2 Equilibrium 2 ( > )
Here, I construct Equilibrium 2 where  > . In Equilibrium 2, goods in [0; ]
and (; ] are produced by the U.S. rms, and goods in (; 1] are produced by
the Japanese rms with AU technology. Note that for the goods in (; ], the
U.S. rms compete with the Japanese rms that have the same level of advanced
technologies.
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Due to the Bertrand competition, the U.S. rms in (; ] set their price at
pU2 = w
J=AU . (I denote the U.S. rm in [0; ] by U1 and the U.S. rm in (; ]
by U2 .) Their unit cost is uc
U
2 = w
U=AU . The Japanese rms set their price at
pJi = w
U=AU . Their unit cost is ucJi = w
J=AU . Because pCi  ucCi ,
w  wU = wJ :
Using the above relation, as in Equilibrium 1, I obtain  in this equilibrium.
Rearranging the Cobb-Douglas property,
pU1 x
U
1 =
w
AJ
AU`U1 = X; p
U
2 x
U
2 =
w
AU
AU `U2 = X;
I obtain the following relations:
`U1 =
1
w
AJ
AU
X; =) `U2 =
1
w
X:
Using these properties and the labor market clearing condition,
LUx =
Z 
0
`Ui di = 
1
w
AJ
AU
X + (   ) 1
w
X: (6)
Next, I obtain a property similar to (2) for Japan. Rearranging the Cobb-
Douglas property,
pJi x
J
i =
w
AU
AU`Ji = X;
I obtain the following relation:
`Ji =
1
w
X:
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Using the property and the labor market clearing condition:
LJx =
Z 1

`Ji di = (1  )
1
w
X: (7)
Using (6) and (7), I nally obtain  in Equilibrium 2:
 =
1
1 +
LUx
LJx

1  A
J
AU

+
LUx
LJx

: (8)
Using (8), I verify under what condition the assumption of Equilibrium 2,
i.e.,  > , is true. Figure 7 plots (8). Figure 7 shows that if
  1
1 + A
J
AU
LJx
LUx
; (9)
 is more than ; i.e., Equilibrium 2 exists.
3.4 Existence of multiple equilibria
(5) and (9) indicate that multiple equilibria exist if
1
1 +
LJx
LUx| {z }
Lower bound of Eq. 1
   1
1 + A
J
AU
LJx
LUx
:
| {z }
Upper bound of Eq. 2
When  is more than the upper bound of the above equation, only Equilibrium 1
exists. On the other hand, when  is less than the lower bound, only Equilibrium
2 exists. I only consider the situation where multiple equilibria exist; i.e.,  is
located between the bounds.
The intuition of why multiple equilibria exist is as follows. In Equilibrium
1, when wU=wJ is high, due to the Bertrand assumption, the price that the
Japanese (U.S.) rms face is low (high). Then, due to the Cobb-Douglas as-
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sumption, the Japanese rms can sell a small volume of goods at a high prot,
whereas the U.S. rms have to sell a large volume of goods at zero prot. This
means that unlike the U.S. rms, the Japanese rms do not require many work-
ers to produce goods As a result, because the labor supply is xed in each
country, the Japanese rms can produce the comparatively less advantageous
goods (i.e., (; 1] is large), whereas the U.S. rms can produce only the compar-
atively most advantageous goods (i.e., [0; ] is small). Then, because the wage
ratio is determined by the relative productivity of the marginal goods (which are
the comparatively least advantageous goods in each country), wU=wJ is high.
Opposite eects yield in Equilibrium 2.
3.5 Technology transfer
I introduce technology transfer to the model. I make the following assumptions
(they are similar to Ghosh and Saha, 2008). First, a U.S. rm can transfer
its technology to a Japanese rm in the same sector. Second, the U.S. rm
agrees to transfer the technology if the prot it can obtain after the technology
transfer, including the licensing fees obtained from the licensee Japanese rm,
is larger than the prot it now obtains. The licensing fees are a part of the
licensee's prot. Third, after the technology transfer, the technology level of
the Japanese rm equals that of the U.S. rm, i.e., AJi = A
U .
When AJi = A
U , the prot of the U.S. rm that competes with the Japanese
rm is zero in both equilibria. Then, the condition that a U.S. rm transfers
technology can be written as follows:
Ji > 
U
i ; or

1  c
J
i
pJi

pJi x
J
i >

1  c
U
i
pUi

pUi x
U
i ;
where Ji is a fraction of prot at each period that the licenser can obtain as
licensing fees after technology transfer, and Ui is the prot the licenser obtains
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before technology transfer.
In Equilibrium 1, Ji > 
U
i = 0, and in Equilibrium 2, 
U
i > 
J
i = 0. Thus,
in Equilibrium 1, a U.S. rm has an incentive to transfer technology, and in
Equilibrium 2, a U.S. rm does not have an incentive to do so.
I further assume that in Equilibrium 1, where the transfer condition is sat-
ised, in each period, a certain number of Japanese rms from the highest i
adopt new technologies; i.e., in each period,  decreases by a certain amount.
Here, I assume that the lower bound of  exists and is 1=(1+LJx=L
U
x ), which is
the lower bound of Equilibrium 1. Then, until  hits the lower bound, since 
also decreases, the Japanese income increases.
Since the transfer condition above is a static one, one might think that under
a dynamic setting the transfer condition would change. However, I assume that
the agents in the economy expect the equilibrium in which the economy is in
now to continue forever. Then, the transfer condition under a dynamic setting
coincides with the static one above.
3.6 The model's interpretation of the rapid growth
Using the model, I interpret Japan's rapid growth as follows. Prewar Japan
was in Equilibrium 2. With no technology transfer, the Japanese economy stag-
nated. After World War II, the equilibrium unexpectedly switched to Equilib-
rium 1, technologies were transferred to Japan, and the Japanese income, which
is proportional to (; 1], increased. After the 1970s, before the per capita GDP
of Japan fully converged to that of the U.S., the equilibrium again unexpectedly
switched to Equilibrium 2. Consequently, technology transfer stopped, and the
Japanese economy stagnated again. Further, the yen-dollar rate appreciated for
wU=wJ to decrease.
This model with the above interpretation is qualitatively consistent with
16
the nding of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). They nd that as countries develop,
their economies become less specialized and more diversied (i.e., they produce
a broader range of goods), but after a certain point of development, they begin
to specialize (they produce a narrower range of goods). In my model, in the
prewar period, (; 1] is narrow; i.e., the Japanese rms produce only a narrow
range of goods. However, after World War II, when the economy switched
to Equilibrium 1, due to technology transfer, (; 1] becomes broader; i.e., the
Japanese rms produce a broader range of goods. After the 1970s, the economy
again switched to Equilibrium 2 and (; 1] decreases; i.e., the Japanese rms
produce a narrower range of goods than when the economy is in Equilibrium 1
with the same  (for this, see the location of Eq:1 and Eq:2 in Figure 5).
4 The Extended Model
In this section, I extend the basic model in the previous section so that it is com-
parable with the data. I introduce (1) non-tradable goods, (2) multiple inputs
for tradable goods, (3) competition within domestic rms, (4) the assumption
that the U.S. licenser rm commits to stop production after technology transfer,
and (5) the externality of technology transfer. In what follows, I explain these
features in greater detail.
4.1 Non-tradable goods
In the basic model, non-tradable goods do not exist. However, in order to argue
the BS eect and compare the model's PPP=e to that of the data, non-tradable
goods are required. I therefore introduce non-tradable goods.
I introduce the following risk-neutral preference as the utilities of households
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in each country:2
uC(cCNt; c
C
Tt) =
8>><>>:
cCNt if c
C
Nt < cN
cCTt + cN otherwise;
where cCNt and c
C
Tt are non-tradable and tradable consumption at date t. This
specication is similar to Eswaran and Kotwal (1993) and Gollin et al. (2007)
(however, note that in their models, cN corresponds to agricultural goods). In
what follows, I drop the time subscript t for brevity.
The production function of non-tradable goods is:
LCcCN = L
C
N ;
where LC is the population and LCcCN is the total demand for non-tradables in
each country. I assume cN = 1   (0 <  < 1). Then,
LCcCN = L
C
N = (1  )LC : (10)
4.2 Tradable goods
In the basic model, there is no capital. However, to explain changes in the labor
income share, it is necessary to introduce capital-like inputs. Here, I introduce
the intermediate inputs and use them in the simulation as a kind of capital
input, as in Parente and Prescott (1999).
I modify the production function of tradable goods in the basic model as
follows:
x^Ci = A
C
i ~x
C
i

`Ci
1 
; x^Ci  xCi + ~xCi : (11)
2By assuming the risk-neutral preference, I abstract from international borrowings and
lendings.
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Thus, each tradable good is produced from labor and this tradable good.
By solving the cost-minimization of a rm, the production function can be
rewritten as follows:
xCi = ~A
C
i `
C
i ; (12)
where ~ACi  (ACi )1=(1 ) and   (1  )1 .
As in the basic model, I assume the following tradable production function
X = exp
Z 1
0
lnxidi

: (13)
The market condition of labor inputs for tradable goods is as follows:
LCx =
Z 1
0
`Ci di: (14)
As in the basic model, I normalize the price of X to be 1.
4.3 Competition between domestic rms
In the basic model, competition exists only between rms in dierent countries.
However, some might argue that in many cases, rms compete with those in the
same country. For example, General Motors competes with Ford.
To accommodate this, I introduce a competitor in the same country. In
addition to the U.S. and Japanese rms in the basic model (referred to as U.S.
and Japanese leader rms), there is also a U.S. follower rm and a Japanese
follower rm. The follower rms have inferior technology. Specically, the
U.S. follower rm has  ~AU technology, and the Japanese follower rm has  ~AJ
technology. I assume that only the U.S. leader rms can transfer technology.
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4.4 Licenser's commitment after transfer
In the basic model, even after transferring its technology, the U.S. licenser rm
sets the competitive Bertrand price as wu= ~AU . However, it is more protable
for the licenser rm to commit not to produce, because when the licenser rm
does not produce, the Japanese licensee rm can obtain higher prots, which
results in higher licensing fees.
To capture this, I assume that for the sector i > , the U.S. leader (licenser)
rm stops producing. Then, the best technology of the U.S. rms in (; 1] is
 ~AU .
4.5 Externality of technology transfer
In the basic model, I assume that after technology transfer, the Japanese rm
instantaneously acquires AU technology. However, in reality, (1) rms gradu-
ally acquire technological know-how, and (2) the know-how of a technology is
acquired when the know-how of other technology is acquired. For example, by
acquiring the know-how of the motherboard production, one can acquire some
knowledge about CPU production and vice versa.
For the rst point, I modify the assumption on technology transfer as follows:
After technology transfer, the technology of a Japanese rm becomes
~AJ
0
= minf ~AJ ; ~AUg; (15)
where  > 1. Under the assumption on the lower bound of  mentioned later,
 ~AJ < ~AU holds. I assume that the best technology of Japanese rms in (; 1]
is ~AJ
0
.
To capture the second point, I impose the following assumption: the ex-
ternality of technology transfer. By technology transfer, overall ~AJ and ~AJ
0
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increase according to
~AJ = g() = minf

A
LUx
LJx
1  


~AU ; ~AUg; (16)
where A is a constant. Under (27) and the assumption on the lower bound of
 mentioned later,

A
LUx
LJx
1 


< 1 holds. Then, as  decreases, ~AJ increases.
The externality assumption (16) is easier to interpret when  = , ~AJ
0
=
 ~AJ , and ~AJ =

A
LUx
LJx
1 


~AU . Then,
~AU
~AJ
=
1
A

1  
LJx
LUx
=
1
A
XU=LUx
XJ=LJx
:
Thus, the assumption basically says that the technology level of a country is
proportional to the income level of the tradables.3
This assumption is needed to guarantee multiple equilibria. Without the
externality assumption, when competition between the rms in the same country
is erce, i.e.,  is close to 1, multiple equilibria disappear.
4.6 Preliminary for solving the model
Under the setup, the productivities of the rms with the best technologies in
each country are
AUi = ~A
U ; AJi = ~A
J ; for i 2 [0; ]; (17)
AUi = 
~AU ; AJi =
~AJ
0
; for i 2 (; 1]: (18)
3Note that since ~AU= ~AJ is the TFP dierence for the goods that Japan does not produce,
it is not the TFP dierence actually measured. To be comparable with measured data, we
might use  ~AU= ~AJ
0
, the TFP dierence for the goods that Japan actually produces.
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The prices these rms face are
pUi = minf
wJ
~AJ
;
wU
 ~AU
g; pJi = minf
wU
~AU
;
wJ
 ~AJ
g; for i 2 [0; ]; (19)
pUi = minf
wJ
~AJ 0
;
wU
 ~AU
g; pJi = minf
wU
 ~AU
;
wJ
 ~AJ
g; for i 2 (; 1]: (20)
4.7 Multiple equilibria
In the same way as in the basic model, I construct Equilibrium 1 in the extended
model, where some Japanese leader rms with ~AJ produce ( < ). (The details
of the derivations are in Appendix A.) In Equilibrium 1,
wU
wJ
=
~AU
~AJ
; (21)
 =
LUx
LJx
1 +
~AU
~AJ
LUx
LJx
" 
~AU
~AJ
  
~AU
~AJ0
!
+
 ~AU
~AJ0
#
: (22)
This equilibrium exists if
  1
1 +
~AJ0
 ~AU
LJx
LUx
: (23)
Next, I construct Equilibrium 2, where some U.S. follower rms competing
with Japanese leader rms with ~AJ
0
produce ( > ). In Equilibrium 2,
wU
wJ
=
 ~AU
~AJ 0
; (24)
 =
1
1 + 
~AU
~AJ0
LUx
LJx
"
(1  )+ 
~AU
~AJ 0
LUx
LJx
#
: (25)
This equilibrium exists if
  1
1 +
~AJ0
~AU
LJx
LUx
: (26)
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By manipulating (16), (23), and (26), I obtain the condition under which
multiple equilibria exist when ~AJ
0
=  ~AJ and ~AJ =

A
LUx
LJx
1 


~AU :

|{z}
Lower bound of Eq. 1
 A  1
|{z}
Upper bound of Eq. 2
(27)
If A > 1=, only Equilibrium 1 exists. If A < =, only Equilibrium 2 exits. I
assume that (27) holds and rewrite A as follows:
A  !

+ (1  !) 1

;
where 0 < ! < 1.
4.8 U.S. rm's decision of technology transfer
The settings for the U.S. rm's decision of technology transfer are the same
as in the basic model: if Ji > 
U
i , the U.S. rm transfers its technology. In
Equilibrium 1, Ji > 
U
i = 0, and in Equilibrium 2, 
U
i > 
J
i = 0. Thus, in
Equilibrium 1, a U.S. rm always has an incentive to transfer the technology, and
in Equilibrium 2, a U.S. rm never has an incentive to transfer the technology.
In the extended model, I specify the details of technology transfer for the
quantitative exercise. I assume that in Equilibrium 1, where the transfer con-
dition is satised, in each period, a certain number of Japanese rms  from
the highest i adopt new technologies: i.e., t shifts from period t to t+ 1 by:
t+1   t =  : (28)
I assume that the lower bound of  exists and is 1=(1 + (1=)(LJ=LU )), which
is the lower bound of (23) when ~AJ
0
= ~AU .
In each period, the Japanese rms to which the U.S. technologies are trans-
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ferred pay fees fJi to the U.S. rms:
fJi = 
J
i for i 2 (t; Prewar],
where Prewar is  at the prewar period (For simplicity, I assume that in the
prewar period, the Japanese rms do not pay licensing fees). I assume the U.S.
rms are owned by domestic households and fJi go to the U.S. households.
Then, the market conditions for tradables become:
LUcUT = X + F
J ; (29)
LJcJT = (1  )X   F J ; (30)
where F J  (Prewar   t)fJit.
4.9 Computing the equilibria
This section explains how the extended model is computed. First, I set the initial
technology level Prewar, a sequence of the U.S. technology levels f ~AUt g, and the
exogenous labor supply LC as exogenous variables. Then, in each period, other
variables are computed as follows.
1. cCNt and L
C
xt are obtained using (10).
2. Given t, ~A
C
it is determined by (15){(18).
3. The equilibrium (Equilibrium 1 or Equilibrium 2) in which the economy
is in at this period is chosen (in the model, shifts between the equilibria
are unexpected to the agents).
4. Given the equilibrium and the above variables,
wUt =w
J
t and t are computed using (21) and (22) in Equilibrium 1 and
(24) and (25) in Equilibrium 2.
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5. Given which equilibrium is computed and the above variables,
wCt is computed using x
C
it = X=p
C
it , (13), (19), and (20).
`Cit (as well as x
C
it and X
C
t ) is computed using `
C
it = X=(p
C
it
~ACit), (14), (19),
and (20).
6. Given the above variables, F Jt is computed using F
J
t = (Prewar t)Ji ,
where Jit = ((1  t)Xt   wJt LJxt)=(1  t).
7. Given the above variables, cCTt is computed by (29) and (30).
8. t+1 is determined by (28).
(For details of the variables in 5 and 6, see Appendix A.)
5 Quantitative Findings
In this section, I calibrate the parameters of the model and use the extended
model to see whether it can replicate the changes in the per capita GDP relative
to the U.S., PPP=e, and labor share of postwar Japan.
5.1 Simulation scenario
I consider the following scenario. First I dene each period as one year and rapid
growth period as 16 years from 1955 to 1971. I dene the years in the model
before the rapid growth period as the prewar period. I assume that during
the prewar period, the economy is in Equilibrium 2 and that Prewar = 1955.
During the rapid growth period, I assume that the economy is in Equilibrium
1 and that during these years, t shifts (decreases) in each period. I dene the
years after 1971 as the post-1971 period. I assume that during the post-1971
period, the economy is in Equilibrium 2 and that Post 1971 = 1971. I assume
that when the equilibrium of the economy switches, it occurs unexpectedly.
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5.2 Calibration
The parameters of the model are reported in Table 2. The values for LU and LJ
are selected to be roughly consistent with the population ratio of the U.S. and
Japan. , the share of intermediate input in tradable production, is 0.5, which
is comparable with Parente and Prescott (2000). , the inverse of the markup
rate, is set to 0.7, which roughly corresponds to the lower bound in Bernard
et al. (2003).4
, the expenditure share of tradable goods in consumption, which is also
the expenditure share of industrial goods in consumption in my model, is set
on the basis of the values of the industrial sector share in the literature. In
Parente and Prescott (1999), they set the share of the industrial sector, which
corresponds to the tradable sector in my model, for developed countries to be
0.84 and the share of the agricultural and services sectors, which correspond
to the non-tradables in my model, to be 0.16. In Greenwood et al. (1997) and
Ngai and Samaniego (2009), in which investment-specic technological change
accounts for a major part of postwar U.S. growth, the share of capital goods is
around 1/3. As an intermediate value, I set  to 0.5.
I choose , the productivity improvement after technology transfer to be 2
on the basis of the argument in Parente and Prescott (1999).5 As in Parente
and Prescott (1999), the results do not depend on the absolute value of ~AU .
Thus, ~AU is set to 1. I set ! to 0.5, because if ! is close to 0 or 1, the existence
of multiple equilibria is dubious.
The rest of the parameters are chosen to roughly match the simulated results
with the data. I set , the share of licensing fees, over the prot so that the
relative per capita GDP does not change much around the end of the rapid
4In their model, the lower bound of the inverse of the markup rate is (3:79 1)=3:79 ' 0:736.
5They argue, \it is not uncommon for the next technological innovation to be between two
and three times more productive than the current technology... (p. 1228)"
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growth period. If  is close to 0, the relative per capita GDP decreases sharply
after 1971. However, if  is close to 1, the relative per capita GDP shoots up after
1971. To be consistent with the data,  should be around 0.5. 1955(= Prewar)
and 1970 are chosen so that the relative per capita GDP of 1955 and 1970 in
the model match those in the data. Finally, given 1955 and 1970,  is pinned
down.
5.3 Construction of articial data
Here, I describe the construction of the per capita GDP of Japan relative to the
U.S., PPP=e, and Japan's labor share in the model.
I follow the Penn World Table (PWT, Heston et al., 2009) to construct per
capita relative GDP and PPP=e (details of the construction are in Appendix B).
Following PWT, I dene nominal GDP (PGDP), nominal consumption (PC),
and nominal investment (PI) as follows:
PGDPC  PCC + PIC ;
PCC  wCcCNLC + cCTLC ;
PIC 
Z
ucCi ~x
C
i di:
Note that the price level of the tradable goods is normalized to be 1 and that
under the setting (11), PIC is calculated as follows:
PIC =

1  w
CLCx :
Using them for both countries and the Geary-Khamis method, I construct the
relative per capita GDP and PPP=e.
27
I calculate Japan's labor share as follows:
Japan's labor share =
wJLJ
PCJ + PIJ + F J
:
To calculate the labor share, I include F J to be consistent with the labor share
data that I use (Hayashi and Prescott (2002) data).
5.4 Simulation results
Figure 8 plots the simulation result of the per capita GDP of Japan relative
to the U.S., together with the actual data. Note that before 1955, I only plot
the simulation result. The model replicates the rapid growth. However, it does
not explain the so-called \stable growth" between the end of the rapid growth
period and the end of the bubble economy in the late 1980s.
Figure 9 plots the simulation result and data of the PPP=e. As with the
relative per capita GDP, the model ts the data well, especially during the rapid
growth period, and roughly captures the surge in PPP=e at the end of the rapid
growth period. However, the model cannot replicate the surge in PPP=e around
1995.
In the simulated model, the relative wage rate as well as the unit cost of
the tradable goods determines the PPP=e. In the standard BS model discussed
in Section 2, only the relative wage rate determines PPP=e. This mechanism
works in the simulated model, where at the end of the rapid growth period,
wJ=wU jumps from 0.31 to 0.88. In addition, in the simulated model, the ratio
of the average unit cost of Japan and the U.S., ucJ=ucU , jumps from 0.52 to
1.41, because the labor cost of the Japanese rms increases. The unit cost is
also important to explain the surge in PPP=e in my model.
Finally, Figure 10 plots the simulation result and data of Japan's labor
share. The model qualitatively traces the movement in labor share. However,
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quantitatively, the model predicts too much decline for the rapid growth period
(in percentage points, the decline predicted by the model is twice as great). One
interpretation of the disparity between the model and the data is that in the
postwar Japanese corporative system, some of the rents (prots) are distributed
among workers.
5.5 What if the rapid growth continued?
According to the model, the rapid growth stopped, in 1972 because the economy
switched from Equilibrium 1 to Equilibrium 2. Then, could the rapid growth
continue if the economy remained in Equilibrium 1 for a few more years? To
answer this question, I perform two types of counterfactual simulations in this
section. In the rst (\counterfactual 1"), until 1980, the economy was in Equi-
librium 1, and in 1980, it unexpectedly switched to Equilibrium 2. I choose 1980
as the switching year for two reasons. First, the growth trend shows that around
1980, the relative per capita GDP converges to 1. Second, I impose the lower
bound of t to be 1=(1 + (1=)(L
J=LU )) in Section 4.8, and the economy hits
the lower bound of t in 1983 if it continues to be in Equilibrium 1.
In the second counterfactual simulation (\counterfactual 2"), the economy
continues to be in Equilibrium 1. In the simulation, as is noted above, since the
economy hits the lower bound of t in 1983, I assume that t decreases until
1983, and thereafter, t = 1983.
The results of the counterfactual simulation are shown in Figures 11 and 12.
The counterfactual simulations show that if the rapid growth continued till 1980
or 1983, PPP=e continued to be low and the per capita GDP of Japan reached
(in \counterfactual 1," it slightly surpassed) the U.S. level. The nal relative per
capita income level of \counterfactual 2" is lower than that of \counterfactual
1" because in the latter, licensing fees are paid to the U.S. rms.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose a model of technology transfer to understand the cause
of Japan's rapid economic growth. In the model, there are multiple equilibria.
In one equilibrium, Japan's labor cost is low and the prots of the Japanese
rms are high. In another equilibrium, Japan's labor cost is low and so are the
prots. The paper's interpretation of Japan's rapid economic growth is that
during the rapid growth period, the former equilibrium was chosen and the U.S.
rms transferred their technology because it was more protable. Technology
transfer was the driving force of the rapid growth. Before and after the rapid
growth period, the latter equilibrium was chosen. During these periods, the
economy stagnated because technologies were not transferred. This model is
quantitatively consistent with the per capita GDP of Japan relative to the U.S.,
the PPP-exchange rate ratio between Japan and the U.S., and postwar Japan's
labor share.
A Derivations of the Extended Model
In the appendix, I derive the properties of Equilibrium 1 and Equilibrium 2
used in Sections 4.7 and 4.9.
A.1 Equilibrium 1 ( < )
Here, I construct an equilibrium where some Japanese leader rms with ~AJ
produce ( < ).
Due to the Bertrand competition, the U.S. leader rms in [0; ] set their price
at pUi = minf
wJ
~AJ
;
wU
 ~AU
g. Their unit cost is ucUi =
wU
~AU
. On the other hand, the
Japanese leader rms in (; ] set their price at pJ1 = minf
wU
~AU
;
wJ
 ~AJ
g. Their
unit cost is ucJ1 =
wJ
~AJ
. (Note that as in the basic model, I denote the Japanese
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rm in (; ] by J1 and the Japanese rm in (; 1] by
J
2 .) Because p
C
i  ucCi ,
from the above relations, I obtain (21):
wU
wJ
=
~AU
~AJ
:
Then, pUi =
wJ
~AJ
, and pJ1 =
wU
~AU
.
The Japanese leader rms in (; 1] set their price at pJ2 = minf
wU
 ~AU
;
wJ
 ~AJ
g =
wU
 ~AU
(=
wJ
 ~AJ
). Their unit cost is ucJ2 =
wJ
~AJ 0
.
Then, for the U.S. rms,
pUi x
U
i =
wJ
~AJ
~AU`Ui = X =) `Ui =
1
wJ
~AJ
~AU
X:
Using the property,
LUx =
Z 
0
`Ui di = 
1
wJ
~AJ
~AU
X: (31)
On the other hand, for the Japanese rms,
pJ1x
J
1 =
wU
~AU
~AJ`J1 = X =) `J1 =
1
wU
~AU
~AJ
X for i 2 (; ];
pJ2x
J
2 =
wU
 ~AU
~AJ
0
`J2 = X =) `J2 =
1
wU
 ~AU
~AJ0
X for i 2 (; 1].
Then,
LJx =
Z 1

`Ji di = (  )
1
wU
~AU
~AJ
X + (1  ) 1
wU
 ~AU
~AJ0
X: (32)
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Using (31) and (32), I obtain (22):
 =
LUx
LJx
1 +
~AU
~AJ
LUx
LJx
" 
~AU
~AJ
  
~AU
~AJ 0
!
+
 ~AU
~AJ 0
#
:
From the equation, I obtain the condition that Equilibrium 1 exists, (23):
  1
1 +
~AJ0
 ~AU
LJx
LUx
:
Next, I explain the details of the derivations of procedures 4 and 5 in Section
4.9, when the economy is in Equilibrium 1. I rst derive wC , `Ci , x
C
i , and X
C .
Substituting xUi = X=(w
J= ~AJ); xJ1 = X=(w
U= ~AU ), and xJ2 = X=(w
U=( ~AU ))
into (13), I obtain
wU = 1  ~AU ; wJ = 1  ~AJ :
Substituting (31) into `Ui = X=((w
J= ~AJ) ~AU ) and (32) into `J1 = X=((w
U= ~AU ) ~AJ)
and `J2 = X=((w
U=( ~AU )) ~AJ
0
), I obtain
`Ui =
LUx

; `J1 =
LJx
(  ) + (1  ) ~AJ~AJ0
; `J2 =

~AJ
~AJ0
LJx
(  ) + (1  ) ~AJ~AJ0
:
Substituting these relations into xUi =
~AU `Ui , x
J
1 =
~AJ`J1 , and x
J
2 =
~AJ
0
`J2 , I
obtain xCi . X is computed from x
C
i using (13). Finally, I derive 
J
i and F
J .
The total prot of the Japanese rms is (1  )X   wJLJx . Since the Japanese
rms in (t; 1] earn the same level of prot 
J
2 at t, the total Japanese prot
is written as (1   t)J2 . By rearranging the relations, I obtain Ji . Among
the Japanese rms that earn prot, the rms in (t; Prewar] pay licensing fees.
Thus, the total licensing fee F J is (Prewar   t)Ji .
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A.2 Equilibrium 2 ( > )
I construct an equilibrium where some U.S. follower rms competing with the
Japanese leader rms with ~AJ
0
produce ( > ).6
Due to the Bertrand competition, the U.S. follower rms in (; ] set their
price at pU2 = minf
wJ
~AJ0
;
wU
 ~AU
g. Their unit cost is ucU2 =
wU
 ~AU
. (Note that as in
the basic model, I denote the U.S. rm in [0; ] by U1 and the U.S. rm in (; ] by
U
2 .) The Japanese leader rms in (; 1] set their price at p
J
i = minf
wU
 ~AU
;
wJ
 ~AJ
g.
Their unit cost is ucJi =
wJ
~AJ 0
. Because pCi  ucCi , from the above relations, I
obtain (24):
wU
wJ
=
 ~AU
~AJ 0
:
Then, pU2 =
wJ
~AJ0
, and pJi =
wU
 ~AU
.
U.S. leader rms in [0; ] set their price at pU1 = minf
wU
 ~AU
;
wJ
~AJ
g = w
U
 ~AU
.
Their unit cost is ucU2 =
wU
~AU
.
Then, for the U.S. rms,
pU1 x
U
1 =
wU
 ~AU
~AU`U1 = X =) `U1 =

wU
X for i 2 [0; ];
pU2 x
U
2 =
wJ
~AJ 0
 ~AU`U2 = X =) `U2 =
1
wJ
~AJ
0
 ~AU
X for i 2 (; ]:
Using the property,
LUx =
Z 
0
`Ui di = 

wU
X + (   ) 1
wJ
~AJ
0
 ~AU
X: (33)
6Due to the assumption in Section 4.4, the U.S. leader rms in (; 1] do not produce.
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On the other hand, for the Japanese rms,
pJi x
J
i =
wU
 ~AU
~AJ
0
`Ji = X =) `Ji =
1
wU
 ~AU
~AJ0
X for i 2 (; 1]:
Similarly,
LJx =
Z 1

`Ji di = (1  )
1
wU
 ~AU
~AJ0
X: (34)
From (33) and (34), I obtain (25):
 =
1
1 + 
~AU
~AJ0
LUx
LJx
"
(1  )+ 
~AU
~AJ0
LUx
LJx
#
:
From the equation, I obtain the condition that Equilibrium 2 exists, (26):
  1
1 +
~AJ0
~AU
LJx
LUx
:
Next, I explain the details of the derivations of 4 in Section 4.9, when
the economy is in Equilibrium 2. Substituting xU1 = X=(w
U=( ~AU )); xU2 =
X=(wJ= ~AJ
0
), and xJi = X=(w
U=( ~AU )) into (13), I obtain
wU =  ~AU ; wJ = ~AJ
0
:
Substituting (33) into `U1 = X=((w
U=( ~AU )) ~AU ) and `U2 = X=((w
J= ~AJ
0
) ~AU ),
and (34) into `Ji = X=((w
U=( ~AU )) ~AJ
0
), I obtain
`U1 =
LUx
 + (   ) ; `
U
2 =
LUx
 + (   ) ; `
J
i =
LJx
1   :
Substituting these relations into xU1 =
~AU `U1 , x
U
2 = 
~AU`U2 , and x
J
i =
~AJ
0
`Ji , I
obtain xCi . X is computed from x
C
i using (13).
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B Construction of Relative Per Capita GDP and
PPP=e
In the appendix, I describe the details of the construction of the per capita GDP
of Japan relative to the U.S. and the PPP=e explained in Section 5.3.
I follow the Penn World Table (PWT, Heston et al., 2009) to construct the
per capita relative GDP and PPP=e. The construction procedure is as follows:
1. As described in the text, following PWT, I dene nominal GDP (PGDP),
nominal consumption (PC), and nominal investment (PI) as follows:
PGDPC  PCC + PIC ;
PCC  wCcCNLC + cCTLC ;
PIC 
Z
ucCi ~x
C
i di:
The PGDP in the model corresponds to the GDP in the exchange rate,
because I normalize the price of tradables to be 1. Under the setting (11),
PIC is written as follows:
PIC =
Z
ucCi ~x
C
i di =
Z

1  w
C`Ci di =

1  w
CLCx :
PIC is calculated from the last expression of the equation.
2. I choose 1972 to be the base year.
3. Employing the Geary-Khamis method and using the prices for consump-
tion (i.e., wC and 1 for non-tradables and tradables) and investment (I
use the geometric weighted average of ucCi s as the price), I calculate the
price levels for PC and PI for the base year.
4. For the other years, using the prices for consumption and investment, I
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calculate the deators for consumption and investment.
5. Using the deators, the price levels for PC and PI for the base year are
deated to all the years.
6. Using PC, PI, and the price levels and employing the Geary-Khamis
method, I calculate PPP (PPP=e) for all the years.
7. Using the PPP, I calculate the relative per capita GDP for all the years.
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Table 1: Prewar and postwar labor income shares of manufacturing
Prewar (1932) Postwar (1957)
50% 34%
Note: Minami (2002) p. 220 and p. 223.
Table 2: Parameters
LU and LJ     ~AUt
2 and 1 0.5 0.7 0.5 2 1
!  1955 1971 
0.5 0.5 0.93 0.73 1971 19551971 1955
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Figure 1: Per capita GDP of the U.S. and Japan
Note: Maddison (2010).
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Figure 2: PPP-exchange rate ratio between Japan and the U.S.
Note: Heston et al. (2009).
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Figure 3: The natural logarithm of the PPP-exchange rate ratio between Japan
and the U.S.
Note: Heston et al. (2009). The solid black lines are added.
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Figure 4: Japan's labor share
Note: Hayashi and Prescott (2002) data. \Labor share 1" is \Compensation of Employees"=\Total Output."
\Labor share 2" is \Compensation of Employees"=(\Total Output" \Net Factor Payments" 
\Indirect Taxes"  \Non-Housing Operating Surplus"), following Gollin (2002)
and Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2002).
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Figure 5: Productivity dierences for the disaggregated goods in [0; 1]
45
Æ


0
1
1
1
1+
L
J
x
L
U
x
Equilibrium 1 exists.
Figure 6: The region of  where Equilibrium 1 ( < 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Figure 7: The region of  where Equilibrium 2 ( > ) exists
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Figure 8: Simulation and data: per capita GDP of Japan relative to the U.S.
Note: Data from Heston et al. (2009).
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Figure 9: Simulation and data: PPP-exchange rate ratio between Japan and
the U.S.
Note: Data from Heston et al. (2009).
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Figure 10: Simulation and data: Japan's labor share
Note: Data from Hayashi and Prescott (2002). For the denitions of labor share 1
and 2, see the note in Figure 4.
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Figure 11: Counterfactual simulations: per capita GDP of Japan relative to the
U.S.
Note: \Model" is the same as the simulation result in Figure 8. In \counterfactual
1," until 1980, the rapid growth continues (the economy is in Equilibrium 1),
and in 1980, the growth suddenly stops (the economy unexpectedly switches to
Equilibrium 2). In \counterfactual 2," until 1983, the rapid growth continues
and after 1983, the growth stops (but the economy remains in Equilibrium 1).
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Figure 12: Counterfactual simulations: PPP-exchange rate ratio between Japan
and the U.S.
Note: \Model" is the same as the simulation result in Figure 8. In \counterfactual
1," until 1980, the rapid growth continues (the economy is in Equilibrium 1),
and in 1980, the growth suddenly stops (the economy unexpectedly switches to
Equilibrium 2). In \counterfactual 2," until 1983, the rapid growth continues
and after 1983, the growth stops (but the economy remains in Equilibrium 1).
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